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FROM PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS
TO PIRACY IN THE HIGH SKIES:
A STUDY OF AIRCRAFT HIJACKING
PETER M. JACOBSON*
The spate of aircraft hijackings during the past decade has prompted
discussion about the analogy between modem-day aerial seizures and
the piracies on the high seas which were so common centuries ago.'
This comparison is not only of academic, but also practical interest. If
aircraft hijacking were universally held to be piracy jure gentium,
then every state in the world community would be authorized to take
quick, effective action to capture and prosecute hijackers, and the
international law would thus contain a significant provision to deter
this menace.
The purpose of this article is to examine the development of the law
of piracy jure gentium and to analyze its present application to the
hijacking problem. In order to determine the extent to which the cus-
tomary law of piracy offers a possible solution to the modern problem,
the relationship between conventions attempting to codify this customary
law and conventions enacted for the purpose of reducing the number
of hijackings will also be explored.2
*instructor in Law, University of Michigan 1971-72; B.A. University of Sydney,
Australia 1965; LL.B. (Hons.) University of Sydney 1968; LL.M. University of Penn-
sylvania 1971. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor N. E. Leech
of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Professor W. W. Bishop of the
University of Michigan Law School for their helpful comments in the preparation of
this article.
1. See, e.g., Shubber, Is Hijacking of Aircraft Piracy in International Law? 43 Barr.
Y.B. OF INT'L L. 193 (1968-69).
2. An analysis of the provisions of the most recent convention on the subjects, the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1970, 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 133 (1971), 64 DEPT OF STATE BuLL. 60 (1971), will
show that it has established a special kind of statutory piracy in respect to aircraft
hijacking.
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I.
PIRAcY JURE GENTU M
A. The Customary Law Modernized
In 1932, a research project under the auspices of the Harvard Law
School, as part of an attempted codification of international law, made
an exhaustive research of the authorities on piracy.3 The rapporteur Of
the project even then predicted that "with rapid advance in the arts of
flying.., it may not be long before bands of malefactors ... will find
it profitable to engage in depredations ... in... the air."4 He therefore
concluded that any attempted codification of the law of piracy should
cover "depredations . . . in or from the air. .. .
The Harvard Research is still the best comprehensive evidence of the
law of piracy available, because in spite of recent conventions,0 custo-
mary law has remained controlling on the subject. It is significant that
under its provisions the commission of piracy jure gentium is a basis
for the exercise of a universal jurisdiction under which any state which
captures a pirate may prosecute and punish him.7 The draft convention
prepared after the completion of the Harvard project was based on the
view that this
... common jurisdiction ... rests on tradition and expediency. It is expediency
that should be the chief guide in the formulation of a convention. The use of
traditional ideas of the nature of piracy . . . should be tempered and con-
3. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, with Com-
ment, 26 Am. J. INT'L LAw 740 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research
on Piracy].
The task of codification was a difficult one because of "the paucity of pertinent
cases and of evidence of modern state practice on most of the important moot points
in the law of piracy." Id. at 764. See also Johnson, Piracy in Modern International
Law, 43 TRANSACTMONS OF THE GROTIUS SociETY 63, 71 (1957).
4. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 309.
5. Id. at 786.
6. Convention on the High Sea, opened for signature April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention];
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, openedfor signature Sept. 14, 1963, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 [hereinafter cited
as Tokyo Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 133 (1971), 64 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 50 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention].
7. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 786. This provision clearly facilitates
the application of legal procedures for the prosecution and punishment of pirates.
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trolled by the realization of the great changes that have occurred through the
centuries in the conditions of commerce and travel .... 8
At the outset, the rapporteur observed that there is a distinction be-
tween international law piracy, which is committed outside all terri-
torial jurisdiction, and acts which are considered statutory piracy under
municipal law and which may include offenses which occur entirely with-
in the territory of one state.9
"The theory of [the] . . . draft convention . . . is that piracy is not
a crime by the law of nations. It is the basis of an extraordinary j urisdic-
tion in every state to seize and to prosecute and punish persons .... The
purpose of the convention is to define this extraordinary jurisdiction."'10
Thus the approach taken by the Harvard Research was to formulate a
definition of the facts that constitute piracy and then leave it to the
states of the world community to implement that jurisdiction by appro-
priate legislation. Within these limits the extent of the jurisdiction
therefore depends on muncipal law.1
The Harvard Research was aware of the "chaos of expert opinion as
to what the law of nations includes, or should include, in piracy"12 but
offered the following definition:
Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a place not within the
territorial jurisdiction of any state:
Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape,
wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy
property, for private ends and without bona fide purpose of asserting a claim
of right, provided that the act is connected with an attack on or from the sea
or in or from the air. If the act is connected with an attack which starts from
on board ship, either that ship or another ship which is involved must be a
pirate ship or a ship without national character.13
Four salient questions arise if this definition is to cover hijacking
of an aircraft: What is the effect of the requirement that the act take
place outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state? Are the delineated
acts of piracy sufficient to include an aircraft hijacking? What is the
8. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 787. The approach taken by the
Harvard Research to codification appears to be acceptable. See M. McDOUGAL & W.
BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEAN 809 (1962)..
9. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 749; Johnson, supra note 3, at 68-69.
10. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 760; See also Johnson, supra note
3, at 69. But see M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 8, at 808.
11. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 760. It should be noted that
international law confers no obligation on states to exercise the jurisdiction.
12. Id. at 769.
13. Id. at 768-9.
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effect of the "private ends" requirement? Can the act of hijacking be
considered piracy when it occurs aboard a single aircraft of any flag
country?
1. Territorial Jurisdiction
Certainly the Harvard Research thought that in order to give rise to
common juisdiction, the act should take place outside all territorial
jurisdiction.14 More recently, this requirement has been called "the
principal feature and indeed the raison d'etre of the traditional law of
piracy"'u as there is no justification for a grant of common jurisdiction
in respect of acts taking place within national territory.'6
If this principle is applied to aircraft it meets with the international
law rule that the territory of a state includes the airspace above it.7
Thus a hijacking which takes place in the airspace above any state
could not be piracy jure gentium unless some assistance can be obtained
from the decision of Dr. Lushington in The Magellan Pirates.'8
That case concerned an insurrection in Chile during which a rebel
officer murdered the governor of Punta Arenas. He and his men then
seized two vessels, the "Eliza Cornish" and the "Florida," which were
anchored in port and, in so doing, murdered several people. Both ves-
sels were later recaptured and an application for bounty was made in
England under the Piracy Act, 1850.19 Dr. Lushington found this to be a
case of piracy and in giving his decision said:
The "Eliza Cornish" and the "Florida" were seized in port, and the murders
committed in port or committed on land, on the persons taken out of the ves-
sels. . . . In this case, however, the ships were carried away and navigated by
the same persons who originally seized them. Now, I consider the possession
at sea to have been a piratical possession; to have been a continuation of the
murder and robbery; and the carrying away of the ships on the high seas
to have been piratical acts quite independently of the original seizure2 0
14. Id. at 749, 760, 781-82, 788. Of course this definition of piracy does not preclude
a state from defining as municipal law piracy acts which take place within its own
territorial waters.
15. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 8, at 813.
16. Johnson, supra note 3, at 71.
17. Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944,
art. 1, 61 Stat. 1180 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter cited as
Chicago Convention).
18. 164 Eng. Rep. 47 (Adm. 1853).
19. 18 & 14 Vict. c. 26.
20. The Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. 47, 50 (Adm. 1853).
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However, it has been remarked that the case is "not very decisive one
way or the other" as the elements of piracy jure gentium and statutory
piracy required for the award of bounty are "intermingled" in the
judgment.21
If an act which in every respect resembles piracy takes place in the air,
whether in the airspace above a state or otherwise, it is submitted that
in modern times expediency and changing conditions of commerce and
travel dictate the exercise of something approaching a universal juris-
diction. The Harvard Research's codification forty years ago was based
on this type of realistic criteria and it may thus be asked in 1972, in
times of rapid air travel, whether it should make a difference in the
exercise of common jurisdiction that a piracy is committed in the inter-
national airlanes above a country rather than in the same traffic lanes but
over the high seas? The picture of the traditional pirate is that of "a
professional robber who sails the sea in a pirate ship to attack and plun-
der other ships ... such pirates are a menace to the interests of every
state which has access to the sea."2' If professional "pirates" carry out
their acts in the air, do they not provide an equal menace to every
state? Thus, should not airspace, regardless of the territory beneath it,
be equated in cases of piracy with the high seas and therefore justify
the exercise of universal jurisdiction? If, for example, a British aircraft
enroute to Israel is hijacked over France, the connection that France has
with the incident is minimal, and there seems no reason for an assertion
of French sovereignty.
The rule giving sovereignty over airspace has already been impinged
upon to grant jurisdiction to the aircraft flag-state in respect of acts
21. Johnson, supra note 3, at 73.
Thus, for example, Dr. Lushington said, " . . I am not disposed to hold that the
doctrine that the port, forming a part of the dominions of [the] state to which it
belongs ought in all cases to divest robbery and murder done in such port of the
character of piracy .. .I am still more inclined to come to that conclusion .. .be-
cause the statute expressly contemplates acts done on shore .. " The Magellan Pirates,
164 Eng. Rep. 47, 50 (Adm. 1853) (emphasis added. However, there is authority
in Regina v. Leslie, 8 Cox. Crim. Cas. 269 (Ct. Crim. App. 1860), that acts committed
in the territory of a state and continuing onto the high seas may be deemed to have
been committed on the high seas. The case concerned false imprisonment, not piracy,
but it applied a similar principle to that adopted by Dr. Lushington. The imprison-
ment took place in Chilian waters under duress by authority of the Government of
Chile which entered a contract with the defendant, who was the master of an English
vessel, to take the plaintiff and others to England. They were conveyed to England
against their will and the court held that while the defendant was not liable for
the acts committed in Chilian waters, he was liable for the imprisonment on the
English ship on the high seas.
22. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 769.
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committed on board its aircraft in foreign airspace.23 It is submitted that
a realistic appraisal of existing patterns of international commerce and
transportation require a further surrender of exclusive jurisdiction over
domestic airspace to curtail an international menace.
2. Acts of Piracy
The piratical acts listed by the Harvard Research include acts of vio-
lence committed with intent to imprison or kill a person. The use of
weapons and threats against the lives of passengers or crew which are
made by hijackers to obtain control of an aircraft seem to fall within
this definition.
The rapporteur outlined the scope of acts included by stating that the
convention generally "covers all serious offenses otherwise like traditional
piracy, although the motive of the offender may ... not [be] an inten-
tion to rob or to gain wealth or otherwise." 24 The Harvard Research's
main concern appears to have been to include those acts which are "a
menace to international commerce. 25
It seems self-evident that the hijacking of an aircraft constitutes such
a menace.
3. Private Ends
The Harvard Research took the view that while there is some authority
that unrecognized insurgents (who may be thought to act for political
purposes) are pirates, the better theory is that piracy should be confined
to actions committed solely for private ends.26 It thus accepted a dis-
tinction based on motives which may in a particular instance be difficult
to distinguish.
In two mid-nineteenth century cases, The Magellan Pirates27 and The
23. Tokyo Convention, art. 3 (1), [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
24. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 790.
25. Id. at 794.
26. Id. at 798. But see H. LAUTEP.PACnT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 307-08
(1947) where the author said, "[P]iracy conceived as organized robbery for the pur-
pose of private gain is now largely obsolete . . . [and accordingly] it would not
seem improper to describe and treat as piratical such acts of violence on the high
seas which by their ruthlessness and disregard of the sanctity of human life invite
exemplary punishment and suppression." See also L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
§272, at 608 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
27. 164 Eng. Rep. 47 (Adm. 1853).
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Serhassan Pirates,28 Dr. Lushington took the opposite view, holding that
it was possible for insurgents to be pirates. However, there are doubts
about the relevance of these authorities today since in both cases it was
impossible to distinguish between the private and political purposes of
the offenders.29
More recently it has been argued that the Nyon Arrangement of
193730 which described as "piracy" the attacks made by submarines that
were assumed to be acting for the contending factions in the Spanish
Civil War, displaced the rule that piracy is a crime committed exclusively
for private ends. However, it seems doubtful that the Nyon Arrange-
ment established a new rule of international law. It was signed by only
nine states31 and "[i]t certainly seems more reasonable to regard the
Nyon Arrangement as an ad hoc arrangement for a kind of collective
self-defense in peculiar circumstances."3 2
The issue was revived in 1961 when a group of passengers seized the
Portuguese liner "Santa Maria" on the high seas. 33 The facts of the seiz-
ure revealed that it was made with the intention of sparking political
consequences in Portugal and not for the purpose of private gain. After
eleven days in control of the ship, the rebels sailed it to. Brazil where
its captors were given asylum. The vessel was returned to Portugal,
making the controversy essentially one of only academic concern.
An editorial by Professor Fenwick seems to conclude that the "Santa
Maria" affair was a piracy but he does not elaborate on the reasons for
his comments.3 4 It is implicit that he believed the offense was private
rather than political as the head of the rebel group "held no public
office before starting his insurgent movement."3 5 But "this has never
been an accepted criterion for distinguishing private from political ob-
jectves" 36 and generally it was considered that the political purpose of
28. (1845) 2 Win. Rob. 354, 166 Eng. Rep. 788 (Adm. 1845).
29. Johnson, supra note 3, at 78-79.
30. The Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 4184.
31. The United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Greece, Roumania, Turkey,
U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia.
32. Johnson, supra note 3, at 85. But see H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 26, at 295,
296-97, 298, 303, 305, 306, 307-08. A broader view is taken of piracy, excluding the
private ends requirement, and criticism of the use of the term piracy in the Nyon
Arrangement is thus said to be not well-founded.
33. The facts of the incident are discussed in Forman, International Law of Piracy
and the Santa Maria Incident, JAG J., Oct.-Nov. 1961, at 148; Green, The Santa Maria:
Rebels or Pirates, 37 B~iT. Y.B. INT'L L. 496 (1961); M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra
note 8, at 821-23.
34. Fenwick, Piracy in the Caribbean, 55 AMt. J. INT'L L. 426-28 (1961).
35. Id. at 428.
36. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 8, at 823.
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the incident removed it from the customary law category of piracy.8 7
Contemporary lawyers, therefore, seem to have accepted the distinc-
tion drawn by the Harvard Research under which it is necessary to look
to the motivation of an offender to determine the nature of his act.
However, many aircraft are hijacked by members of revolutionary organi-
zations, or by citizens escaping politically oppressive regimes, or simply
by political radicals who seek publicity by flying to Cuba. In such cases,
there is almost always a very thin line between motivation for private
gain and political purposes.38
While some of the hijackings of United States aircraft to Cuba, and
the hijackings from Soviet bloc countries, seem to be more for private
purposes than any other, it has been suggested that defense of a political
organization is "a sort of public purpose."30 Therefore, it can be argued
that "hijackings of aircraft by some political groups, acting either in
pursuance of the political aims, or in defiance of the political regime
of the flag state" are not committed for private ends.4 0 As such, the hi-
jackings of Israeli aircraft by members of the Palestine Liberation groups
and some of the Cuban and Russian hijackings perhaps should not be
regarded as piratical.
4. Single Flag Aircraft?
The Harvard Research's definition contemplates that unless the attack
is made from one vessel to another, all the action must take place on a
pirate ship. According to this definition, the "Santa Maria" incident,
which took place entirely on one flag vessel, could not be piracy.41
The rapporteur explained that:
This limitation ... is designed to exclude offenses committed in a place sub-
ject to the ordinary jurisdiction of a state. The limitation follows traditional
law. . .. The great weight of professional opinion . . . does not sanction
an extension of the common jurisdiction of all states to cover ... offenses com-
mitted entirely on board a ship which by international law is under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of a state whose flag it flies. Even though a mutiny suc-
37. Foreman, supra note 33, at 148; Green, supra note 33, at 503; M. MODOUGAL &
W. BuRKE, supra note 8, at 822-23; cf. 4 M. WInTEMAN, DIGEST OF INT'L L. 666 (1965)
which states that "[since the ship was taken over by certain of its own passengers
[apparently for private ends], and not by another ship . .. it was considered that
for this, if for no other reason ...." it was not piracy.
38. Shubber, supra note 1, at 200.
39. Johnson, supra note 3, at 78.
40. Shubber, supra note 1, at 200.
41. M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 37, at 666.
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ceeds, the common jurisdiction would not attach. It should attach, however, if
the successful mutineers then set out to devote the ship to the accomplishment
of further acts of violence or depredation . . . on the high seas .... 42
This statement is ambiguous in that it is not clear whether mutiny
carried out with a mere intention to commit piracies is sufficient to
give rise to the common jurisdicton before an attack against another
vessel is either launched or attempted. Aside from this ambiguity, the
explanation is compatible with the traditional idea of a pirate as a
plunderer who sailed the seas attacking other ships and distinguishes
that person from a mutineer. However, the statement should be com-
pared with the following passage from Oppenheim:
If the crew, or passengers, revolt on the open sea and convert the vessel and
her goods to their use they commit piracy. . . . But a simple act of violence
on the part of crew or passengers does not constitute in itself the crime of
piracy.... They are pirates only if the revolt is directly not merely against
the master, but also against the vessel, for the purpose of converting her and
her goods to their own use.4 3
In fact, the Harvard Research did not consider the possibility that a
"mutiny" might occur on board aircraft and confined its comments to
attacks which commence on board ship.44 However, it should be re-
membered that the articles drafted by the Harvard Research were pre-
pared long before the outbreak of aircraft hijackings.
Thus, while the Harvard Research recognized that mutineers could
become pirates if they used (or, quaere, intended to use) the ship to
carry out further acts of violence, Oppenheim suggested the additional
requirement of conversion of the vessel. While true that the aircraft is
not used to carry out acts of violence or depredation against other air-
craft, the hijackers do use their possession (or control) to carry out
such acts against passengers and crew. Therefore, if it is the case that the
aircraft is actually converted to the use of the hijackers,45 and if Oppen-
heim is correct on the law, then it can be argued the hijackers have
by that act become pirates.
42. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 809-10.
43. L. OPrs nr' m, supra note 26, §274, at 614. The "one vessel requirement" is even
clearer in the statement (§272 at 609> that " . . if the members of the crew re-
volt and convert the ship, and the goods thereon, to their own use, they are con-
sidered to be pirates, although they have not committed an act of violence against
another ship." See also In Re Piracy Jure Gentium, (1934) App. Cas. 586 at 598-599
(P.C.).
44. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 809-20.
45. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 83-84 (3rd ed. 1964), says that
conversion is ". . . an intent to exercise dominion or control over the goods which
is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights ..... " and the problem then is
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The question of whether hijacking can be piracy if committed en-
tirely on one aircraft is not satisfactorily answered by the authorities. 40
As with the other questions, it raises problems arising from "doctrinal
controversies of the past." 47
However, we are now in an age of rapid mass transportation by air
in which aircraft are from time to time hijacked from their routes at
considerable risk to the lives of passengers and crew. It is evident that
there have been great changes in conditions affecting world travel in the
forty years since the Harvard Research was undertaken. In accordance
with the Research's own precepts, the definition of the offense of piracy
required modification to recognize these changes and eliminate the
need to stretch aging phrases to fit modern conditions.
B. The Customary Law Codified
The Harvard Research's attempt to codify the law of piracy did not
result in the adoption of any multilateral treaty. However, a more suc-
cessful effort did take place under the auspices of the United Nations.
At the first session of the International Law Commission in 19,19,
J.P.A. Francois was elected special rapporteur to study the regime of
the high seas "with a view to the codification or the progressive develop-
ment of international maritime law."4 8 In 1955, the Commission adopted
a provisional draft including articles on piracy. 49 The following year,
after examining replies from governments about the draft, it drew up a
final report.5O Subsequently, the definition of piracy formulated by the
Commission was adopted as Article 15 (1) of the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion on the High Seas.
whether the interference is of a sufficiently serious nature. CLERK AND LINSDELL ON
ToRTS §900 (12th ed.) states that there need not be an intention to ac-
quire ownership and a "... transitory exercise of dominion may ... amount to con-
version."
46. Foreman, supra note 33, at 147, refers to the conflict of authority and suggests
that "whatever view of the law is taken . . .a conspiracy occurred outside the 'Santa
Maria' which set in motion a chain of events during which the conspirators boarded
the ship in the guise of passengers." He thus implies that the acts of violence on one
ship could be customary law piracy. This argument, though equally applicable to
hijacking of aircraft, is, to say the least, formalistic.
47. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 85.
48. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 10 U.N. GOAR, Supp 9, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/2934
(1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Report].
49. Id.
50. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 11 U.N. GOAR, Supp. 9, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3159
(1956) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Report].
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The work of the International Law Commission was completed before
the outbreak of hijackings in the past decade, but if the question had
been considered by the Commission, it would probably not have con-
sidered aircraft hijacking as piracy. In the Commission's view," . . . acts
committed in the air by one aircraft against another aircraft can hardly
be regarded as acts of piracy." 5' 1 Hijackings, therefore, which are usually
committed solely on board one aircraft, would also have been excluded
from the definition of piracy. However, the Commission's articles were
intended only to codify international maritime law and the hijacking of
an aircraft has no connection with that branch of international law
save for the incidental fact that in some instances acts of hijacking may
take place in the airspace above the high seas. The Geneva Convention
is therefore inapplicable as a treaty with respect to aircraft hijacking,
but as it purported to declare established international law,52 its state-
ment of the law of piracy should be considered as persuasive authority
on the subject.
The International Law Commission's definition of piracy provided
that:
Piracy consists in any of the following acts:
Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation committed
for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private air-
craft, and directed
(a) on the high seas, against another ship or against persons or property
on board such a ship;
(b) against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any state.63
51. 1955 Report, supra note 48, at 7; 1956 Report supra note 50, at 28. The 1955
Report stated that such acts "cannot be regarded as acts of piracy while the 1956
Report stated that such acts can hardly be regarded as acts of piracy". (Emphasis
added.)
52. Geneva Convention, preamble, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
53. 1956 Report, supra note 50, at 28.
The earlier draft stated that:
"Piracy is any of the following acts:
1. Any illegal act of violence, detention or any act of depredation directed against
persons or property and committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a
private vessel or a private aircraft:
(a) Against a vessel on the high seas other than that on which the act is committed, or(b) Against vessels, persons or property in territory outside the jurisdiction of any
State."
1955 Report, supra note 48, at 6.
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The Commission acknowledged its debt to the Harvard Research of
1932 whose findings on the law of piracy it generally endorsed 4 and the
rapporteur then made the following comments on the article:
(I) The intention to rob (animus furandi) is not required. Acts of piracy
may be prompted by feelings of hatred or revenge, and not merely by the de-
sire for gain;
(II) The acts must be committed for private ends;
(III) Save in [a special case now provided in Article 16 of the Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas]55 . ..piracy can be committed only on private
ships .. .;
(IV) Piracy can be committed only on the high seas or in a place situated
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state, and cannot be committed
within the territory of a state... ;
(V) Acts of piracy can be committed not only by ships on the high seas,
but also by aircraft, if such acts are directed against ships on the high seas;
(VI) Acts committed on board ship by the crew or passengers and directed
against the ship itself, or against persons or property on the ship cannot be
regarded as acts of piracy.5 6
The article and comments together enable some further conclusions
to be drawn on the issues raised in the four questions which were con-
sidered under the Harvard Research's definition of piracy.
1. Territorial Jurisdiction
The rapporteur's explanation of the scope of jurisdiction is similar to
that of the Harvard Research. By their definition the hijacking of an
aircraft which takes place in the airspace above a state cannot be piracy
because of the international law rule that the territory of a state in-
cludes the airspace above itY5
2. Acts of Piracy
Under the Harvard Research's' definition there had to be an act of
violence or depredation carried out with the intention to commit any of
the type of crimes which was listed. The Commission's definition added
54. 1955 Report, supra note 48, at 6; 1956 Report, supra note 50, at 27.
55. The Article provides that acts of piracy committed by the crew of a warship,
government ship or government aircraft shall be assimilated to acts of piracy by a
private ship.
56. 1956 Report, supra note 50, at 28; 1955 Report, supra note 48, at 6.




the act of detention, but deleted the list of crimes replacing them with
the term "illegal." It did not intend that the acts should be criminal
by the law of any particular state but "the apparent purpose merely was
to include a great range of types of coercive behavior."' 8
Accordingly, the kind of acts which take place during a hijacking
seem to fall within such a range.
3. Private Ends
The Commission's definition includes the requirement adopted by the
Harvard Research that the act of piracy must be committed for private
ends.59
In the International Law Commission, the members from the U.S.S.R.
and Czechoslovakia argued that as a result of the Nyon Arrangement
of 193760 it was possible for a warship to commit acts of piracy and
therefore, since a warship must be acting for a state, the private ends
criterion was no longer valid.61 This inference was not accepted by the
other members of the Commission.6 2
4. Single Flag Aircraft
It might appear from paragraph (b) of the definition that acts of
piracy can take place solely on board one aircraft, but the ambiguity is
resolved by the rapporteur's fifth and sixth comments above and his
statement that:
In considering as 'piracy' acts committed outside the jurisdiction of any
state, the Commission had chiefly in mind acts committed by a ship or air-
craft on an island constituting terra nullius, or on the shores of an unoccu-
pied territory.6 3
Paragraph (b) of the definition thus varies from paragraph (a) only
in the area of its application.64
58. M. McDOUGAL & W. BuRKE, supra note 8, at 812. But see Foreman, supra note
33, at 168, where the author contends that the interpretation is not clear.
59. Thus the legal effect of the "Santa Maria" incident which occurred after the
signing of the Geneva Convention on the High Sea was not altered by that Convention.
60. The Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 4184.
61. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. CONW'N 64-65, 71-72, at 43; 17-18, at 55; r 19, at 56 (1955).
62. 1955 Report, supra note 48, at 7; 1956 Report, supra note 50, at 28.
63. 2 Y.B. INTL L. COTaM'N 253, 282, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956).
64. Shubber, supra note 1, at 201.
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It is thus clear from the rapporteur's explanation that the Geneva
Convention on the High Seas resolved the controversy about the number
of vessels required for an act of piracy in favor of a two vessel criL
tenlon. Indeed, he noted in debates that the draft was based on the
principle that "Acts of piracy were necessarily acts committed by one
ship against another ship -which ruled out acts committed on board a
single vessel."65 The statements from the Harvard Research and Oppen-
heim, which are cited earlier in this paper, were cited in opposition, 00
but the rapporteur did not acknowledge the ambiguity in the Harvard
Research's statement or the difference between that statement and
Oppenheim's view. It is therefore submitted that the International Law
Commission's decision on this point was misguided.67 The Swedish
member did propose a draft which took the opposite viewpoint from the
rapporteur but it was rejected 6s and the rapporteur later commented
that:
The view adopted by the Commission . . . tallies with the opinion of most
writers. Even where the purpose of the mutineers is to seize the ship, their
acts do not constitute acts of piracy.69
Both the Harvard Research and the International Law Commission
purported to codify the law of piracy before hijacking of aircraft became
"fashionable" in the 1960's. The rationale of the Harvard Research,
upon which the Commission relied, was that piracy on the high seas
was formerly such a menace to international shipping that it required
the existence of a universal jurisdiction. It also observed that a codifica-
tion of the scope of the jurisdiction should find its basis in expediency
and be tempered by changing conditions of commerce and travel.
It appears that aircraft hijacking is not considered piracy jure gentium
simply because the hijacking act takes place on board a single aircraft.
While there is disagreement among the authorities on this issue, both
customary law and the Geneva Convention on the High Seas seem to
65. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. Corm'N 32, at 39-40 (1955).
66. Id. 52, at 41-42; 54, at 42.
67. See Foreman, supra note 33, at 168. Commenting on the "two ships requirement"
he says that "[t]his element is not critical in considering the facts of the 'Santa Maria'
episode" and thereby implies that the Commission's definition was, in this regard,
based on a false premise.
68. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMi'N 6, at 51-52; 21, at 53 (1955).
69. 1955 Report, supra note 48, at 7; 1956 Report, supra note "50, at 28. But see
L, OPPENHEINM, supra note 26, § 274, at 614.
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exclude, at least by analogy, the application of the law of piracy to
hijackings on this ground.
In addition, hijackings which take place in the territorial jurisdicton
of a state and those "political" hijackings which are not carried out for
private ends are not generally considered piracy jure gentium.
Nevertheless, in recent years, aircraft hijacking has become such a
common occurrence that it is a menace to international aviation. For
this reason, the case for granting universal jurisdiction over hijacking is
today as compelling as the case for granting similar jurisdiction over
piracy on the high seas. However, it seems preferable to grant by con-
vention a limited universal jurisdiction in respect of hijacking rather
than to redefine piracy to fit the new crime. In this way the jurisdiction
could be clearly delineated and would not be hindered by "doctrinal con-
troversies of the past" which are inherent in the law of piracy.7 0
II.
THE TOKYO CONVENTION ON OFFENSES AND CERTAIN OTHER AcTs
COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT 7 1
(THE TOKYO CONVENTION)
The Harvard Research and the International Law Commission ap-
proached the problem of piracy by defining a factual area in which inter-
national law could operate. The Tokyo Convention, on the other hand,
deals with hijacking quite differently. As the title suggests, it is not
purely a hijacking convention but rather it attacks the broader subject
of crimes committed on board aircraft. In so doing, it only attempts to
buttress the operation of national laws in this field by trying to overcome
international legal problems of jurisdiction and extradition of offend-
ers.
The measures adopted by the Convention in those areas of interna-
tional law have been the subject of extensive comment. 72 Therefore the
70. It will be seen in § C supra that international law has achieved this ob-
jective.
71. Tokyo Convention, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
72. See, e.g., Boyle & Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention On Offenses and certain Other
Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, 30 J. Am L. CoMm. 305 (1964); Gutierriz, Should
the Tokyo Convention of 1963 be Ratified, 31 J. AIR L. CoMm. 1 (1965); Boyle,
Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed in Flight: An International Convention, 3 Am.
CRm. L. Q. 68, (1964-65); Fitzgerald, The Development of International Rules Con-
cerning Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft, 1 CAN. Y.B.
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Convention will only be discussed in so far as it relates to the law of
piracy jure gentium.73
It has been suggested by one scholar that, under the Tokyo Conven-
tion, hijacking can be regarded as "a special, perhaps a limited, type of
piracy." 74 The crux of this argument is that Article 11, paragraph 1 of
the Convention obliges Contracting States to take "all appropriate
measures to restore control of the hijacked aircraft to its lawful com-
mander or to preserve his control of the aircraft." Therefore, the com-
mentator notes, "the use of the plural in the provision, in addition to
the lack of any geographical limitation on its application, indicates
that this right is intended by the drafters to be exercised by every state
party to the Convention."75
It has been observed earlier that the significance of piracy jure gentium
is that it recognizes a universal jurisdiction so that any state which cap-
tures a pirate may arrest and prosecute him. However, the Tokyo Con-
vention allows only "universal coercive measures" to be taken against
hijackers by Contracting States, for Article 11 does not speak at all to
the subject of jurisdiction. When a hijacking takes place, the only op-
portunity that a state is likely to have to take the measures which the
Article envisages is when the aircraft actually lands in its territory. If
that happens, the state may arrest the offender but the Article does not
authorize prosecution by that state unless the jurisdictional provisions
of the Convention which are contained in Articles 3 and 4 come into
effect.
Moreover, "the approach taken by [Article 11] to the crime of un-
lawful seizure of aircraft avoids attempting either the description of an
international crime or the attempt to make such action a crime under
international law." 76
Accordingly, it is submitted that the Tokyo Convention did not grant
any kind of universal jurisdiction in respect of hijacking.
INT'L L. 230 (1963>; Fitzgerald, Development of International Legal Rules for the
Repression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 269 (1969).
73. The more recent efforts to solve the problems of jurisdiction and extradition
are considered in more detail in § C infra.
74. Shubber, supra note 1, at 202.
75. Id. at 203.




CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT 7 7
(THE HAGUE CONVENTION)
In the years following the Tokyo Convention, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) realized that the Convention did not
"cover adequately" the hijacking problem.78 In February 1969, a sub-
committee of ICAO met and drew up a draft convention 79 which was
amended at a subsequent meeting in October of that year.80 Unlike the
Tokyo Convention, it dealt purely with aircraft hijacking rather than
the broader subject of crimes aboard aircraft. In February 1970, the
ICAO Legal Committee held sessions and prepared a further draft con-
vention 8 ' based on the earlier work of the Subcommittee.8 2
The Legal Committee decided to present the text to the states as a
final draft8 3 and it was then agreed that the convention would be de-
bated at a special diplomatic conference at the Hague in December
1970.84 The general objective of the draft conventions (and the Confer-
ence at the Hague) was "to see that the state in whose territory the
hijacked aircraft has landed will ... either prosecute the hijacker itself
or else extradite him for prosecution in some other state having juris-
diction." 85
The special diplomatic conference was held at the Hague December
1-16, 1970, and approved a Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (hereinafter "The Hague Convention") .86 It entered
77. Hague Convention, 10 INT'L LEO. MAT. 133 (1971), 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 50
(1971).
78. ICAO Doc. 8838-LC/157, para 1, at 33 (1969).
79. Id. at 13.
80. Id. at 113.
81. ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, at 12 (1970).
82. 1d. para. 4, at 1.
83. Id. para. 26, at 9.
84. INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (18TH COMMISSION), HIJACKING OF Am-
CRAFT 28 (Provis. Rep. & Draft Res., McWhinney, Rapporteur 1970) [hereinafter cited
as McWhinney].
85. Id. at 28-29.
86. 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 13 (1971), 64 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 50 (1971). The Conven-
tion was signed at the Conference by the following nations: Afghanistan, Argentina,
Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cam-
bodia, Canada, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda,
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into force on October 14, 1971, 30 days after ratification by the tenth
signatory state.8 7
Article 1 of the Hague Convention lays down a definition of the of-
fense of hijacking in the following terms:
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight:88
(a) Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimi-
dation, seizes or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform
any such act, or
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform
any such act, commits an offense.
The definition is identical with that accepted by the ICAO Legal
Committee8 9 but should be compared with Article 11 of the Tokyo
Convention which includes "an act of interference" in the wrongful
conduct with respect to which states are to take coercive measures. The
Legal Committee rejected a proposal to include a reference to "interfer-
ence" 90 and another which would have made illegal the taking on board
of firearms and other dangerous weapons. 91 Commenting on the Legal
Committee draft, Professor McWhinney said:
The ...Committee ...presumably to try to ensure as wide as possible an
acceptance . . . by individual states, has therefore resisted attempts to expand
the scope of the offense.... This generally cautious philosophy is manifest in
the legal Committee's unwillingness to accept a concrete proposal ...to give
the offense described in Article 1 a specific name in the Convention.92
Definitions contained in some national laws are also broader and more
comprehensive than that adopted by the Hague Convention.93
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United
States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia. 64 DE,'T STATE BuLL. 35 (1971).
87. Hague Convention, art. 13, para. 3. Ratifications by the U.S. and Switzerland
on Sept. 14, 1971 made up the required number for the convention to come into
force. Instruments of ratification had previously been deposited by Japan, Bulgaria,
Sweden, Costa Rica, Gabon, Hungary, Israel and Norway. 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 871
(1971).
88. Under the Hague Convention, art. 3, para. 1, "(A) n aircraft is considered
to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed
following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for dis-
embarkation." Cf. Tokyo Convention, art. 3 (1>, (1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768.
89. ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, art. 1, at 2.
90. Id. para. 26, at 26.
91. Id. para. 8, at 36.
92. McWhinney, supra note 84, at 4.
98. Id. at 4-7 sets out a list of definitions adopted by the laws of the United States,
Cuba, Australia, Argentina and Brazil.
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By Article 2, "each contracting state undertakes to make the offense
punishable by severe penalties." The acting chief United States delegate,
Mr. Rhinelander, said of the provision:
We think this is important and in keeping with the grave nature of the act.
The Convention throughout recognizes hijacking as a serious crime, an impor-
tant step forward in the development of conventional international law.9 4
Article 4 of the Convention makes a significant contribution to inter-
national principles of jurisdiction over aircraft hijacking. Paragraph 1
goes beyond the Tokyo Convention because it requires Contracting
States to establish jurisdiction over hijackings committed not only on
board aircraft registered in that state but also in cases in which the hi-
jacked aircraft lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on
board, regardless of the state in which the aircraft is registered. There is
no geographical limitation on the exercise of the latter jurisdiction
except the qualification that the offender must arrive in the state on
board the hijacked aircraft.
When the Legal Committee of ICAO discussed the jurisdictional pro-
visions of the draft convention, questions were raised about aircraft
registered in one state but operated by a national of another state, or for
that matter by a corporation having its head office in another state.9 5
"[T] here was support for the view that the state of which the operator
was a national might have a greater interest in securing the prosecution
of the alleged offender than the state of registration" of the hijacked
aircraft,906 but a proposal to give jurisdiction to the state where the
operator is "incorporated or established" was defeated. 97 However, the
viewpoint which was rejected in the Legal Committee has been given
expression in the Convention because in addition to the above juris-
dictional requirements, paragraph 1 of Article 4 requires states to estab-
lish jurisdiction over offenses committed aboard leased aircraft where
the lessee has his principal place of business or permanent residence in
that state.
The jurisdictional provisions of Article 4 (1) are complemented by the
provisions for extradition in Article 8. In many instances the state" which
wishes to prosecute a hijacker will find that the offender has flown the
aircraft to the territory of some other state and has either been taken
94. Statement by Mr. Rhinelander, 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 51, 52 (1971).
95. ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, para. 11.1, at 5.
96. Id. para. 25, at 9.
97. Id. para. 11.1, at 5.
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into custody or given refuge there. Provision for extradition of offenders
is therefore a vital part of a convention on aircraft hijacking. In this
regard, Article 8 (4) requires that:
The offense shall be treated for the purpose of extradition between Contract-
ing States as if it had been committed not only in the place in which it oc-
curred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1.
The Convention under this paragraph aims at enabling states which
establish jurisdiction to obtain extradition of offenders.
However, Article 4 (2) which adopts a universal criminal jurisdiction
over hijacking "akin to the response of states in prior years to the
threat of piracy,"98 is not complemented by the extradition provisions
of the Convention. This Article is supplementary to the jurisdictional
provisions of Article 4 (1) and states that:
Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offense in the case where the alleged
offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to
Article 8 to any of the States mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article.
This jurisdiction, unlike Article 4 (1), places no qualification on the
way in which the hijacker is to have arrived in a state's territory. It
therefore covers the possibility that a hijacker might be apprehended in
a state other than that in which the hijacked aircraft lands. Therefore,
any state which captures the hijacker has jurisdiction to prosecute him.
However, since there is no provision entitling a state which bases juris.
diction on Article 4 (2) to treat the offense as having occurred in its
territory, a state which relies solely on the universal jurisdiction granted
by this Article cannot make a request for extradition of an offender in
order to prosecute him. Further, if a state has detained the offender
based solely on jurisdiction under Article 4 (2), it will (subject to the
provisions on extradition which will be considered shortly) have to
grant a request for extradition if made by a state claiming jurisdiction
under Article 4 (1).
Article 4 (3) repeats Article 3 (3) of the Tokyo Convention whereby
"any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law"
is not excluded, but the Hague Convention, like its Tokyo predecessor,
does not offer any formula for the order of exercising jurisdiction. How-
98. Statement by Mr. Rhinelander, supra note 94, at 52.
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ever, that problem is partially resolved by the fact that only those states
which are required to establish jurisdiction under Article 4(1) obtain
the benefit of the provision for extradition.
Under Article 6 of the Convention:
Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State
in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present, shall
take him into custody or take other measures to ensure his presence . . .99
The rest of the paragraph and the three further paragraphs of the Article
provide certain due process safeguards. The detaining state is also re-
quired by Article 6 (4) to notify the state of registration of the aircraft
and the state of the lessee's principal place of business or residence (but
notably not the state where the aircraft may have landed) that it is
holding the hijacker and "shall indicate whether it intends to exercise
jurisdiction." It is possible that a hijacked aircraft may make a number
of landings before the hijacker is captured and the failure to require
notification of an intermediary landing state is an implicit recognition
of the transient connection of that state with a hijacking incident.
Article 7 contains the key to the Convention:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever,
and whether or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. These au-
thorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offense of a serious nature under the law of that State.100
Thus the universal criminal jurisdiction in respect to hijacking is re-
inforced by an obligation incurred by the state in whose territory the
hijacker is found to submit the case for prosecution. This takes a step
beyond the law of piracy, under which the universal jurisdiction is
"permissive" rather than obligatory.101
The obligation imposed by Article 7 is couched in stronger terms than
in the ICAO Legal Committee's draft102 since the words "without ex-
ception whatsoever" have been added, and in addition, a state is to
99. 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 133 (1971), 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 50 (1971) (emphasis added).
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. Harvard Research on Piracy, supra note 3, at 760.
102. ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, art. 7, at 14. It states that: "The Contracting State
. shall, if it does not extradite the alleged offender, be obliged to submit the case
to its competent authorities for their decision whether to prosecute him. These
authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of other of-
fenses."
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submit the case "for the purpose of prosecution" rather than merely for
a "decision whether to prosecute." However, the Article remains sub-
stantially unchanged, and it has been remarked that in the earlier draft
by the Legal Committee that:
this particular objective [was] hardly attained in foolproof fashion: Article 7
throws the initiative back to the Ministry of Justice of the state in which the
hijacker has compelled the aircraft to land, and the final decision as to prose-
cution [turned] upon the effectiveness of the national laws concerned and also
upon the degree of interest in obtaining a successful prosecution on the part
of the relevant national authorities.103
That statement is equally applicable to the new Article because in
any provision for national prosecution the effectiveness of national laws
and, in particular, the state's interest in prosecuting the case, will always
have a considerable bearing on the outcome. But if "prosecute or extra-
dite" is to be the legal solution to hijacking, it is difficult to conceive
that it could be framed in stronger terms than Article 7 of the Hague
Convention. Nevertheless, with regard to that solution, there are still two
important omissions from the Convention.
First, it provides only a partial answer to questions about the way in
which extradition of an offender from a detaining state is to be carried
out. It has been observed that provision is made for a state which asserts
jurisdiction under Article 4 (1) to obtain extradition of an offender and
if the detaining state fails to grant a request for extradition from a state
claiming jurisdiction under Artcle 4 (1), it would be in breach of their
extradition agreement and, as will be seen shortly, of Article 8 of the
Convention. However, the Convention contains no provision governing
the detaining state's order of obligations when it receives a request for
extradition from more than one state entitled to assert jurisdiction under
Article 4 (1). No effect was given to the United States' proposal that
states should give first priority to the extradition of hijackers to the
state of registration of the hijacked aircraft. 104
Second, in view of the obligations which states incur with regard to
prosecution, the Convention should contain a statement of the rule ne
bis in idem (rule against double jeopardy). A person who has been
prosecuted in accordance with the Convention might afterwards be pres-
103. McWhinney, supra note 84, at 29.
104. Statement by Mr. Stevenson, 64 DEP'T STArE BULL. 50 (1971). But Article 3 (3)
provides that the Convention shall apply only if the place of takeoff or actual land-
ing of hijacked aircraft is outside the territory of the state of registration. It therefore
gives implicit recognition to the primacy of the state of registration which is not
accorded in the other articles of the Convention.
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ent in another state which is interested in prosecuting him a second time,
particularly if the first state has found him not guilty of the offense or
has given a mitigated punishment. The Convention should thus pro-
tect individuals from subsequent criminal proceedings. In the ICAO
Legal Committee, a proposal to include a statement of the rule was re-
rejected. This occurred apparently because the principle is not applied
in a uniform way in all states and because some states are parties to
international agreements on the subject.10 5 These reasons are unconvinc-
ing in the light of the move taken by the Hague Convention to impose
international jurisdictional obligations.
The issue of extradition is dealt with by the Hague Convention in
Article 8. Paragraph 1 of that Article ensures that the offense of hijack-
ing, as defined by the Convention, will be included in extradition
treaties between Contracting States and therefore imposes an obligation
on a state which detains a hijacker to extradite him if an appropriate
request is received. Paragraph 2 attempts to overcome the situation
where no extradition treaty exists between states by providing that the
state receiving an extradition request may "at its option consider this
Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offense."
Paragraph 3 provides that Contracting States which carry out extradition
other than on the basis of a treaty shall recognize the offense defined by
the Convention "as an extraditable offense between themselves." Fin-
ally, paragraph 4 of Article 8, as noted earlier, enables states which are
required to establish jurisdiction under Article 4 (1) to obtain extradi-
tion of offenders.
Article 8 thus serves the purpose of a multilateral extradition treaty
between Contracting States, and while it may operate to facilitate ex-
tradition between them, it does not mention two exceptions usually con-
tained in bilateral extradition treaties, namely nonextradition of na-
tionals and political offenders. It should be observed in this regard that
extradition is to be subject to "conditions provided by the law of the
requested state,"100 which is likely to contain provisions preventing the
extradition of its own nationals and of political offenders. 107
The answer which some argue the Convention offers to these diffi-
culties is that Article 7 obliges states to prosecute or extradite "without
105. ICAO Doc. 8877-LC/161, para. 23, at 8 (1970).
106. Hague Convention, art. 8, paras. 2, 3, 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 133 (1971), 64 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 50 (1971).
107. These provisions are contained in most extradition treaties. See 6 M. WHITE-
MAN DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 800, 865 (1968); Harvard Research in International Law,
Draft Convention on Extradition and Comments, 29 Ar. J. INT'L L. 1, 108, 124
(Supp. 1935).
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exception whatsoever." However, in the original draft Convention pre-
pared by the ICAO Subcommittee, 08 a majority of members took the
view that under Article 8, the terms of which are similar to the adopted
provisions of the Hague Convention, a state:
may refuse extradition of the alleged offender in accordance with its national
law, for example where the offender was its own national or was seeking
asylum from persecution or acted from political motives.... The Subcommit-
tee was unanimous that . . . the requested state could refuse extradition if
it considered that the request had been made for a political purpose.10O
The Subcommittee's view should be adopted since Article 8 does not
alter the terms of existing extradition treaties except with respect to the
list of crimes for which extradition is to be granted. The Convention
thus does not exclude the usual exceptions of the political refugee and
of nonextradition of nationals but, in those cases, leaves it to the state
in whose territory the offender is found to prosecute him. Of course, this
leaves certain leeway for favorable treatment of such offenders.
In addition, there is a question of interpretation: is the state obliged
to prosecute at all? Article 14 of the United Nations' Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights provides that "everyone has the right to seek and
enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." 110 Certainly Article
7 of the Convention allows no exception "whatsoever," but it is arguable
that since the "right" of asylum is not specifically abrogated it is there-
fore not contravened."1
The dilemma which the Convention faced on the issue of asylum has
been well put by one commentator:
Hijacking . .. is inextricably intertwined with the notion of political offenses
and the concept of asylum .... Hence, if an international agreement requir-
ing extradition or prosecution is to function in deterring the forcible diversion
of aircraft in flight, it must be a compromise between the preservation of the
state's right to grant refuge to individuals who flee from persecution and the
need to discourage hijackers. The adoption of too liberal a provision on the
108. ICAO Doc. 8838-LC/157 at 15.
109. Id. paras. 14, 14.1 at 21. See also Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: Its Cause and
Cure, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 709 (1969).
110. U.N. Doc. A/811 at 71 (1948).
111. But see Mr. Rhinelander's statement that "In brief, this convention deprives
hijackers of asylum from prosecution. . . . My delegation believes this convention
marks an important international reaction to lawless acts which, regardless of moti-




issue of asylum will fail to solve the problem of hijacking, while too strict
a requirement for extradition or prosecution will be unacceptable to many
nations.=1t
But the method of compromise adopted by the Convention was to avoid
specific mention of asylum and the related subject of political offenses
thereby leaving unstated the circumstances in which asylum can be
granted. The United States proposed "that the convention prohibit re-
fusal of extradition on the ground that the offense of hijacking is itself
a political offense"1 1 3 but no such statement was adopted.
The term "political offense" is indeed controversial and somewhat
vague, but it is possible to define the type of political purposes which
would justify a grant of asylum to aircraft hijackers.
A suggestion adopted from the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees114 is that the obligation to prosecute or extradite of-
fenders should not prevail when the motivation for a hijacking is "a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion."" 5 This formula should be adopted since the politics of the
world community demand the existence of a right of states to grant
asylum in "deserving" cases. The formula could be applied reciprocally"16
by all states and international law would therefore reflect international
political realities as well as a meaningful standard of justice.
CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention's embodiment of the legal controls of piracy
jure gentium with respect to the modern crime of aircraft hijacking
is important evidence of its serious attitude toward hijacking. Since
the Convention grants jurisdiction to any state which may apprehend
hijackers, it enables the world community to act promptly and effec-
tively in punishing them, and should be viewed as a vital step in the
development in international air law of a new and universally accepted
type of piracy jure gentium which, if properly implemented, could sub-
112. McMahon, Air Hijacking: Extradition as a Deterrent, 58 GEo. L.J. 1135, 1150
(1970).
113. Statement by Mr. Stevenson, supra note 104, at 51.
114. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
The suggestion is made by McMahon, supra note 112, at 1151.
115. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
116. Any standard should be capable of reciprocal application. Reeves, Political
Hijacking: What Law Applied in Peace and War, 22 VANa. L. REv. 1117, 1121 (1969).
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stantially deter would-be hijackers.
However, the question must still be asked whether this in itself is a
sufficient answer to aircraft hijacking. The comparatively broad ac-
ceptance of the Convention ensures that in numerical terms it will be
regarded as a success. Nevertheless, some important problems remain.
Any international legal convention which attempts to deal with a crime
motivated by such a multitude of social and political forces faces enorm-
ous obstacles to its effectiveness. Hijackers have included fleeing
criminals (many of whom have sought asylum in Cuba),'17 military
deserters, matrimonial deserters, dissatisfied Cuban refugees returning
to Havana, dissatisfied Americans seeking refuge in Cuba, and liberation
group members (especially from the Palestine Movement) demanding
political and monetary ransom for the safe return of passengers and air-
craft.118 In many instances, the hijackers have suffered from mental
disturbances." 9 The question may well be asked how many individuals
within these various groups can be deterred by the threats created by
universal liability to prosecution and severe penalties.
The Hague Convention itself has some serious shortcomings. First, it
does not attempt to define what shall constitute valid political motives
for seeking asylum in another country. As such, the country gaining
jurisdiction over an offender at the time when the aircraft touches down
on its national soil has broad latitude in determining whether the hi-
jacker shall be subject to extradition, or even punished at all. Presum-
ably, therefore, if the hijacker heads for a country where his political
views are readily accepted, he may step from the plane with less than
mortal fear of the treatment he is likely to receive as a consequence of
his act.
Second, the Convention is certain to operate as a multinational extra-
dition treaty only between states which already have extradition
treaties of their own. Unfortunately, the hijackings which have created
the greatest international difficulty have involved states which do not
have such treaties. These states may at their own option invoke the Con-
vention as a legal basis for extradition,120 but the fact that they have not
taken steps to handle this problem on their own in the past suggests
that they would be unlikely to do so.
117. Cuba, which has provided a haven for so many hijackers did not even par-
ticipate in the Hague Convention.
118. Evans, supra note 109, at 700-701.
119. id. at 701.
120. Hague Convention, art. 8, para. 2, 10 Ir'L Lr. MAT. 133 (1971), 64 DEP'T
STATE BuLL. 50 (1971).
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Third, the Convention leaves open the question of what happens if a
signatory refuses to comply with its provisions. It neither gives relief to
the offended state, which would be a difficult task in any event, nor does
it provide sanctions against a state which fails to comply with its pro-
visions. It has been suggested that one means of putting teeth into inter-
national hijacking conventions is to make the appropriate convention
provisions an annexure to the bilateral agreement which is generally
used as the basis for air transportation between two countries. If a state
then failed to comply with its obligations under the annexed convention
provisions, the other party to the bilateral air agreement would have the
right to suspend its air operations to the offending country.' 21 This plan
seems unlikely to gain wide international acceptance and, moreover,
the states involved in a hijacking incident may not even have a bi-
lateral air agreement. The United States, for example, does not conduct
service to Cuba, nor do Israeli and Arab civil aircraft fly between each
other's territory. Thus as one commentator has put it:
It is one thing to delineate the cause and to speculate about the cure of air-
craft hijacking, but quite another to accomplish control of this offense in
practical terms. Search of passengers and baggage, prosecution of an offender
by the state of landing of a hijacked aircraft or after his extradition to the
state of registration of the aircraft, and the publicizing of these controls should
help to reduce the incidence of hijackings. Such methods will be effective only
if there is concerted international recognition of the seriousness of this offense
in the air age and determination to co-operate in its control.122
Finally, it is evident that in order to "accomplish control of this of-
fense in practical terms,"'123 the provisions of the Hague Convention
would require reinforcement through the establishment of physical
impediments in the path of potential hijackers. These measures should
emphasize tighter airport security rather than in-flight controls be-
cause it is clearly more difficult for passengers to hijack an aircraft
if they are prevented from carrying weapons and explosives on board,
and since preventive action against an armed hijacker on an air-
craft already in flight often creates more dangers than the hijacking it-
self.
121. Proposal of the Canadian delegation to the ICAO Extraordinary Assembly in
June 1970. McWhinney, supra note 84, at 52.
122. Evans, supra note 109, at 710.
128. Id.
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